Eduardo Duque Rosas

PhD Student in Economics and Management
London School of Economics and Political Science

Working Papers

Local Non-Bossiness

with Juan Sebastián Pereyra and Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Revise and resubmit · Journal of Economic Theory

The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is both stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her classmates without modifying her school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness. Along with strategy-proofness, it ensures a local notion of group strategy-proofness in which manipulating coalitions are restricted to students in the same school. Furthermore, local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in incentives when students have preferences over their colleagues.

Presentations: 14th Conference on Economic Design, 2025; Recent Advances in School Choice Workshop, 2025; Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2024; 35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, 2024.

The Strong Effects of Weak Externalities on School Choice

with Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

In classical school choice contexts there exists a centralized assignment procedure that is stable and strategy-proof: the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism. We show that this property is not satisfied when externalities are incorporated into the model, even in scenarios in which students are primarily concerned about their own placement. Indeed, although weak externalities have no effects on stability, there are school choice contexts in which no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. Furthermore, we show that stability and strategy-proofness are compatible if and only if schools' priorities are Ergin-acyclic.

Presentations: 23rd Annual SAET Conference, 2024; 2023 International Conference on Public Economic Theory, 2024; SECHI – Chilean Economic Society, 2023; Universidad de los Andes, Chile, 2023.

Work in Progress

Consumers' Activism Against Collusion in the Retail Market

with Jorge Alé-Chilet, Nano Barahona, Andrés González-Lira, and Sebastián Otero

Other

Stability and Incentives in Matching Markets with Externalities

MSc Thesis · Universidad de Chile · In Spanish